We study in this paper the time evolution of stock markets using a statistical physics approach. We consider an ensemble of agents who sell or buy a good according to several factors acting on them: the majority of the neighbors, the market ambiance, the variation of the price and some specific measure applied at a given time. Each agent is represented by a spin having a number of discrete states q or continuous states, describing the tendency of the agent for buying or selling. The market ambiance is represented by a parameter T which plays the role of the temperature in physics: low T corresponds to a calm market, high T to a turbulent one. We show that there is a critical value of T , say Tc, where strong fluctuations between individual states lead to a disordered situation in which there is no majority: the numbers of sellers and buyers are equal, namely the market clearing. We have considered three models: q = 3 ( sell, buy, wait), q = 5 (5 states between absolutely buy and absolutely sell), and q = ∞. The specific measure, by the government or by economic organisms, is parameterized by H applied on the market at the time t1 and removed at the time t2. The agent follows the majority of his neighbors in the ambiance T , guided by the price, under the effect of H. He decides his action, buy or sell, following a probability taking into account the mentioned parameters. We have used Monte Carlo simulations to study the time evolution of the price as functions of those parameters. Many striking results are obtained. In particular we show that the price strongly fluctuates near Tc and there exists a critical value Hc above which the boosting effect remains after H is removed. This happens only if H is applied in the critical region. Otherwise, the effect of H lasts only during the time of the application of H. The second party of the paper deals with the price variation using a time-dependent mean-field theory. By supposing that the sellers and the buyers belong to two distinct communities with their characteristics different in both intra-group and inter-group interactions, we find the price oscillation with time. Results are shown and discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Statistical physics models treat large ensembles of particles interacting with each other via interactions of various kinds. Much has been achieved in the understanding of their properties in different situations 1 . In particular, collective behaviors such as those observed in phase transitions and in correlated dynamics have been demonstrated as consequences of the microscopic underlying interactions between particles, the space dimension and the system symmetry.
Social systems with a large number of members interacting with each other via some rules which are not always well defined due to the very nature of human beings. Nevertheless, we can see macroscopic effects of a society via surveys, and behavior studies. This means that in spite of the fact that a human is not a particle, collective behaviors retain only common features, washing away individual particularities in the averaging process.
The interaction of an individual with his neighbors under the social ambiance (peace or unrest) has been used in many domains such as politics and sociology [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . Quantitative sociodynamics using stochastic methods and models of social interaction processes has been investigated 8 . The validity of statistical laws in physics and social sciences has been examined 9 . In particular, the role of the interaction network in the emergence of diversity of behavior has been shown 10 . Using interacting social networks, social conflicts have been studied using models of statistical physics [11] [12] [13] with the mean-field theory and Monte Carlo (MC) simulations. It is noted that MC simulations have been used with success to study social phenomena 14 .
We note that sociophysics models try to outline essential ingredients which govern macroscopic behavior of a society. Knowing these, one can predict a collective behavior in order to avoid undesired effects or to intervene to change the course of its evolution if necessary 7 . We will see an example in this paper.
Statistical physics used to study economic problems has been called "econophysics" 15 . As in sociophysics, the correspondence between physical quantities and parameters can be interpreted in economic terms. We will give some discussion in the next section on this point.
Econophysics is a research field using theories and methods developed by physicists in order to solve problems in economics. These methods usually include uncertainty or stochastic processes and nonlinear dynamics which are inherent to economic matters [16] [17] [18] .
In this paper, we consider the problem of the evolution during the time of the price in a commodity market by examining the effects of several parameters. There is an enormous number of works dealing with the stock markets. We can mention a few of them: a book on the price theory and applications 19, 20 , stock market crashes 17 , pricing policy 18 , price fluctuations 21 , stock market behaviors [22] [23] [24] and scaling behavior in the dynamics of an economic index 25 .
Price variation is subject of many investigations trying to find rules to predict or to understand the market dynamics. These investigations used many methods. Let us mention a few of them. Hsu et al. 26 have used a probability model for describing rates of return based on the hypothesized phenomenon of a changing variance, Castanias 27 has studied the correlation bertween macroinformation and the variability of stock market prices, Cutler et al. 28 have investigated some causes which move the stock prices by estimating the fraction of the variance in aggregate stock returns that can be attributed to various kinds of news. Bak et al. 29 have constructed simple models of a stock market, and argued that the large variations may be due to a crowd effect, where agents imitate each other's behavior. Tse et al. 30 have constructed complex networks to study correlations between the closing prices for all US stocks that were traded over two periods of time (from July 2005 to August 2007; and from June 2007 to May 2009). Networks have been used in a work by Huang et al. 31 who employed a threshold method to construct China's stock correlation network and then study the network's structural properties and topological stability. They found that it follows a power-law model. Sun et al. 32 have used a multifractal analysis of Hang Seng index to study the variation of the Hong Kong stock market, Chang et al. 33 have used a fuzzy model to test with success on the Taiwan Electronic Shares from the Taiwan Stock Exchange. Song et al. 34 have investigated the evolution of worldwide stock markets using correlation structure and correlation-based graphs.
The above mentioned works show that there have been many models trying to find rules for price variation in stock markets. Large variations in stock prices happened so frequently that one can raise doubts about universal models which can be applied to many situations. In this paper, we introduce a new model inspired from models of statistical physics 1 but with modifications where they should be for econophysics. Our model contributes to the family of already abundant stock price variation models, but as seen below, it gives rise to new features not seen before in the price variation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II is devoted to the description of our model with emphasis put on the meaning of physical parameters in economic issues. The method of Monte Carlo simulation is briefly described in this section. In section III, we present the results of three models: the 3-state model, the 5-state model and the continuous model. Section IV is devoted to a mean-field study. The model used in this section uses the assumption that the sellers and the buyers belong to two communities with different intra-group interactions and different inter-group interactions. This non symmetrical interactions give rise to the price oscillations in a region of market temperature. Mean-field results are shown and discussed. Concluding remarks are given in section V.
II. MODEL AND METHOD
We recall a simple textbook static model of a market for one commodity (one can say one good). There is a population of agents facing an aggregate supply function S (P ). The decision of every agent i is a demand of good x i . The price P is determined by market clearing (i.e. supply=demand)
Consider the inverse supply function p (.) = S −1 (.). Market clearing rewrites
We assume a linear and increasing function p
where A and B are two positive real parameters.
The demand x i of agent i can take a finite number of values. For example,
This static game is repeated indefinitely (time is discrete: t = 1, 2, ...):
The decision x i,t of every agent i are revised according to some learning algorithm based on the past values P (t − 1) and x j,t−1 where the agents j are i's neighbors. This algorithm has 2 main features: -x i,t is increasing in the x j,t−1 (agent i imitates his neighbors' past behavior) -the effect of P (t − 1) on x i,t is twofold: a higher price decreases i's demand (direct effect), a higher price reveals that other agents buy a lot, which increases i's demand (indirect informative effect, due to i's imitation of others' behavior). Hence, x i,t can be either increasing or decreasing in P (t − 1). Since P (t − 1) = p ( i x i,t−1 ), the demand x i,t can be increasing or decreasing in i x i,t−1 .
The practical implication of these remarks for numerical simulations is that the two cases (x i,t increasing or decreasing in i x i,t−1 ) should be considered.
In the simulation, we translate the above rule into a model in statistical physics using a spin language: a spin σ i describes the state of an agent i. σ i has several states, for example σ i = −1, 0, 1. Each state represents an action: let's define σ i = 1 for buying action, σ i = −1 for selling, and σ i = 0 for waiting. The action of agent i is guided by different mechanisms described in what follows.
We consider an ensemble of N agents. The Hamiltonian for σ i is given by
where a > 0. Let us explain each term: i) The first term represents the sum of the influence on σ i (t) at the time t by his neighbors' attitudes at the time (t − 1). For simplicity, we assume here all neighbors have the same interaction J with σ i (t). This will not alter general aspects of the model. The agent imitates the majority of his neighbors ii) In addition to the influence of neighbors given by the first term, σ i (t) also depends on the price tendency given by the second term: let N (up, t − 1) (N (down, t − 1)) be the number of the people who wants to buy (sell) at the previous time t − 1. The price is proportional to N (up, t − 1) − N (down, t − 1), namely * if N (up, t − 1) > N (down, t − 1), i. e. more people who buy, so the price is high (increasing), σ i may take the value −1 (sell), against the buying tendency of the first term, to take benefits of selling at a high price * if N (up, t − 1) < N (down, t − 1), i. e. more people who sell, so the price is low (decreasing), σ i may take the value +1 (buy), against the imitation tendency of the first term, to take advantage of buying at a low price
iii) The third term is a market-oriented measure to boost buying if H is positive, or to favor selling if H is negative. This measure can be applied for a lapse of time and is removed to leave the market evolve Note that the decision of σ i (t) at a given T (to buy, to sell or to wait) depends on the balance of the three terms in Eq. (5) . It is the total sum which matters.
Before describing the Monte Carlo method, let us discuss the correspondence between parameters from statistical physics and their meaning in economics. First of all, the temperature T in physics is an external parameter which acts on each particle in a way to make it disordered (thermal agitation): higher T higher disorder. Second, particles interact with each other via an interaction J which leads to some order or collective structure, in contrast with T which favors disorder. Therefore, there is a competition between T and J. Third, particles have various natures. We are interested here in particles defined by spins. A spin in statistical physics is an object characterized by a number of internal states. An Ising spin has two states up and down, a XY spin has two components, a Heisenberg spin has three components, ... In this paper we take a spin with one component of integer amplitude S but, unlike the Ising spin, it has 2S + 1 states: -S, −S + 1, −S + 2,..., 0, 1, 2,..., S + 1. For S = 1, one has three states M = −1, 0, 1.
In sociophysics, spins are individuals in a society. Their internal states represent their opinion on a subject. Interactions between them need not to be symmetric, i. e. A interacts with B not in the same way as B interacts with A (see discussion in Refs. 11, 13 ).
In econophysics, a spin is an economic action of an agent (selling, buying or waiting, for example). The market temperature T means the economic ambiance resulting from many factors such as political situation, economic crisis, international conflicts, ... Low T means stability, peace. High T means unstable ambiance.
Let us now briefly describe the Monte Carlo algorithm used in this work (see details in Refs. 11, 13 ):
• We generate a system of N individuals. Each of them has a random initial value among -1, 0 and 1, with a chosen percentage of each kind randomly distributed
• We fix the "temperature" T which represents the market agitation, analogous to the temperature in physics: low (high) T corresponds to peaceful (agitated) economic ambiance
• At the time t we calculate E i (t) of the individual σ i (t), using the state of its neighbors at the previous time (t − 1).
• We try to change the action σ i (t) to a new action and calculate the energy difference
with its current state -if ∆E i < 0 the individual follows its neighbors' influence and the market tendency to take the trial state for its state at t.
-if ∆E i > 0 the individual changes only its state according to a probability proportional to exp
• We start again from step 3 for t + 1 and repeat a large number of time to follow the time evolution of the system.
Note that the price P (t) can be defined as
where a is a proportional constant and A is stable price determined by the market clearing, namely when N (up, t) = N (down, t).
In practice, we can start the simulation at a given T with different initial conditions, for example with 70% of σ up (buying), 30% of σ down (selling), and leave the system evolve to the final state at that given T .
III. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION RESULTS
We perform Monte Carlo simulations using a network of N = 4x12 3 = 6912 agents on a lattice where each agent has 12 nearest neighbors (NN). We limit in the present paper the interactions between NN with the same interaction strength J as indicated in Eq. (5) .
It is interesting to examine first the stability of the market as a function of T . By stability we mean that the interaction term in Eq. (5) dominates, namely the collective effect with correlation among agents is present. This occurs when T is lower than a value T c beyond which agents are independent of each other because the agitation of T which breaks the correlation. This temperature T c is called "transition temperature" which is seen by anomalies in various quantities such as the system energy E, the order parameter M , fluctuations of E and M called calorific capacity C v and susceptibility χ in statistical physics. These quantities are defined as
where < ... > indicates the time average.
We show in Fig. 1 the above quantities as functions of T , taking J = 1, a = 3 and H = 0. These quantities show the role of T which allows us to choose appropriate temperature regions when examining the dynamics if the system. As seen in the figure, the energy changes the curvature and the order parameter falls to zero at T c = 6.6957 (the residue of M after T c is due to the size effect). The fluctuations are very strong, C v and χ show a peak at T c , indicating the transition from the low-T phase to high-T disordered phase. We will see below that it is in the critical region just below T c that interesting dynamics occurs. A. Case of more people who sell
We show in Fig. 2 the time evolution of the seller and buyer percentages S at some typical market temperature T for J = 1, a = 3 and H = 0. We use the initial condition: more people to sell than people to buy. At a low T , each agent imitates the majority of his surrounding neighbors who sells so that the price decreases and the system quickly comes to an equilibrium of percentages at that given T , as seen in Fig. 2a . Near T c , the difference in the percentages is reduced as seen in Fig. 2b . Note the strong fluctuations of S which occur in the critical region of market temperature. For T > T c the two populations are equal (not shown), as expected. T It is interesting to examine the effect of the boosting measure H. Taking the same system as that used in Fig. 2 , we apply H = 0.2 at the time t 1 = 400 and remove it at t 2 = 600. A striking effect is observed in Fig. 3 :
-if T is just below T c , namely T is in the critical region, the boosting effect lasts for a long time after t 2 (see Fig.  3a ).
-if T is far below T c or well above T c (Fig. 3b ) the boosting measure goes away as soon as it is removed. This effect is very interesting because it shows that boosting measures from government or economic organisms are efficient only in the turbulence zone just below T c . We show in Fig. 4 the variation of the price at three typical temperatures: well below T c , near T c and above T c . At low T the H effect is not significant, at high T the effect disappears when H is removed. Near T c , the boosting effect remains unchanged after the removal of H.
The time evolution of the price P is shown in Fig. 4 at several market temperatures with and without a boosting measure. These curves result from the percentage variations of buyers and sellers shown in Fig. 3 . A discussion was given there.
At this stage it is interesting to examine the effect of the amplitude of H. We have seen in Fig. 4b the jump in the price at H = 0.2. We show in Fig. 5a the case when H = 0.05. We see here that the long lasting jump remains. However when H = 0.02 (Fig. 5b) , that jump disappears. It means that there is a critical value H c (between 0.02 and 0.05) above which the long-lasting jump sets in. The above result is a very important finding: to boost the price for a long lasting, the measure has to be strong enough and taken in the critical region of the market temperature (crisis, unrest) in a short lapse of time.
B. Case of more people who buy
Let us take the case of more people who want to buy than people who want to sell. We start the simulation with for example 60% buyers and 40% sellers among the agents. In this case, at low T each agent imitates the majority of his neighbors, leading to more people to buy. As a consequence, the price increases. We show in Fig. 6 the time evolution of the percentages of buyers and sellers at several market temperatures. One observes strong fluctuations in the critical region. The price P as a function of time is shown in Fig. 7 for three typical temperatures below, near and above T c . Figure 7a shows the price when H = 0. One notes that for T < T c the price is higher than the market clearing price fixed at 3. Figure 7b shows the effect of H applied to reduce the price (with a negative value H = −0.2). As seen, the effect of H is not significant at T << T c and T > T c . However just below T c , one observes a striking effect of H: a strong fall of price and this fall remains unchanged after the removal of H. This feature has been found above for the case of more people to sell than people to buy: we found a long-lasting price jump just below T c . As the previous case, H should be stronger than a critical value for a long-lasting jump to occur.
C. Model of 5 individual states
Let us consider the 5-state model: -2, -1, 0, 1, 2. Negative values express two degrees of selling desire (strong and moderate), while positive values express two degrees of buying desire. The market-temperature effect is shown in Fig.  8 where one recognizes the critical value T c = 21.051 for parameters J = 1, a=6, H = 0. Note that the susceptibility χ expresses the fluctuations of the order parameter M .
The case of less people to buy (40%) than people to sell is initially started, namely the initial price is lower than the market clearing price. The time evolution of the percentages of buyers and sellers are shown in Fig. 9 . At low T , agents follow mainly the majority of their neighbors' desire so that the percentage of sellers is higher than that of buyers ( Fig. 9a ). At T c there are strong fluctuations seen in the agent percentages and in the price. At T > T c , the price is stabilized at the market clearing. These features are common with the 3-state case above.
We examine now the effect of boosting measure H. We show in Fig. 10 the time evolution of the price for several values of H. Fig. 10a shows the case of a strong value of H, namely H = 0.6, at several T . As seen, the boosting measure lasts only during its application except when T is near T c where the effect seems to last forever (green curve). When we decrease H down to H = 0.4, the same effect is still observed (not shown). At H = 0.35 the boosting falls down when H is removed (Fig. 10b) . Thus, there is a critical value between H = 0.35 and 0.4 above which the boosting effect is long-lasting.
The same feature is found when we start with more buyers, namely the initial price at T < T c is higher than the market clearing price. The specific measure applied to reduce the price has a long-lasting effect only in the region just below T c if |H| is larger than a critical value between 0.35 and 0.40.
D. Continuous model
Let us consider the case where the each agent has a continuous spectrum of states going from a strong selling desire S = −1 to a strong buying desire S = 1 in a continuous manner: S ∈ [−1, 1]. The determination of T c by examining the order parameter M and the susceptibility χ gives T c = 3.513.
We show in Fig. 11 the case of more sellers than buyers initially. As in the previous cases, the price is low for T < T c and reaches the market clearing value for T ≥ T c . We have as before strong fluctuations of the price at and near T c (see Fig. 11d ).
We show in Fig. 12 the effect of boosting measure H applied between t 1 = 400 and t 2 = 600 (in MC-step time unit). The percentages of sellers and buyers make a jump at near T c . This jump lasts even after the removal of H. The effect of H on the price reflects the variations of seller and buyer percentages as shown in Fig. 13 for three values of H: 0.06, 0.025 and 0.02. At each value of H four temperatures are examined, two below and two above T c . While for H = 0.06 and 0.025 a long-lasting jump of the price is seen at T just below T c , the case of H = 0.02 does not show such a jump. The critical value of H is thus between 0.02 and 0.025. 
IV. MEAN-FIELD THEORY
The mean-field theory (MFT) is a very popular method in statistical physics. Its principle consists in taking into account only the average values of the neighbors acting on a spin, neglecting real-time fluctuations of each neighbor. In doing so, the calculation of thermodynamic properties is simple and the main features can be easily obtained.
In this paper, we use a time-dependent MFT, namely a spin at the time t interacts with its neighbors of the same community in their state at t − 1 and interacts with the average value of the other community at t − 1. We recall that a spin σ i (t) describes the state of an agent i at t. The time-dependent MFT has been used to study social conflicts [11] [12] [13] . We follow the same method in the present paper.
In order to make our problem of price variation richer, we consider in this section a more general situation which consists of introducing the following hypotheses: • The buyers and the sellers belong to two distinct communities. The intra-community interactions are different, namely J 1 for the buyer community and J 2 for the seller. Note that in Eq. (5), we have only J for both. This two-community hypothesis expresses the fact that in reality the moral of willing to sell or to buy is different. Sellers and buyers do not share the same enthusiasm.
• The interaction between the communities 1 and 2, namely K 1,2 , does not need to be equal to K 2,1 . This hypothesis means that "you want to sell, but I do not want to buy". So in general K 1,2 = K 1,2 . They are different in magnitude and in sign.
For our present problem with the hypotheses described above, the energy E i of an agent of group i (i = 1, 2) at time t is written as 
where we introduce the lag time in the above equations by letting the preference s 1 and s 2 at time t interact with the averages s 1 and s 2 evaluated at an earlier time t − 1. Here time is measured in units of the delay time.
The value of an individual in each group at the time t is given by the MFT equations
where j n = J n /T and k n,m = K n,m /T for n,m = 1, 2. We use units such that k B = 1. The sums on the right hand sides of the above equations lead to the Brillouin function (p. 292 in Ref. 
Equations (14)- (15) can be written as:
For a given set of (J 1 , J 2 , K 12 , K 2,1 , a) at the market temperature T , we can solve numerically these equations iteratively as a function of t: taking input values (initial condition) for s 1 (t = 0) and s 2 (t = 0), we calculate s 1 (t = 1) and s 2 (t = 1). Using these values we calculate s 1 (t = 2) and s 2 (t = 2) and so on. Note that as in the model for MC simulations, the MFT model has two separate communities: the initial value of buyers σ 1 (t = 0) should be positive and that of σ 2 (t = 0) should be negative, but in the MFT each group starts with 100%. The constant a in the case of two-group MFT model is more important than in the MC model as will be seen below.
As the time evolves, s 1 and s 2 change. We have to bear in mind that in the present MFT hypotheses, the average value < s i > ((i = 1, 2)) means the percentage of the community i with the following convention: positive < s i > represents the percentage of people who want to buy, negative < s i > represents that of people who want to sell, as we have used in MC model below Eq. (5) .
For simplicity, we choose M 1 = M 2 = 1, namely s = −1, 0, 1 in Eqs. (14)-(15) (three-state model). Let us show now the results of the MFT.
Before the interaction between two communities is turned on, the will strength of the group i depends on the intra-group interaction J i . Choosing (J 1 , J 2 ), we plot the will of each groups against the market temperature T in Fig. 14. The values < s i > in Fig. 14 represents the will degree of group i. The higher T the lower | < s i > | meaning that less people of the group want to sell or buy. At the market temperature T c i the group i becomes disordered, namely no market orientation (buying or selling). Due to the difference of J 1 and J 2 , we see that T c 1 = T c 2 . We turn on now the interaction between the two groups. For the parameters J 1 = 1, J 2 = 0.5, K 12 = 1, K 21 = −0.5 and a = 5 used in Fig. 15 , the two groups are both ordered below T c1 5.01 . They both become disordered above T c2 12.10. This is the market clearance point. Between these two temperatures, the systems are dynamically not stable. We show the time evolutions of < s 1 > and < s 2 > in Fig. 15 at several market temperatures. Depending on T , the dynamic behaviors of < s 1 > and < s 2 > are different:
• At low T namely T < T c1 , each group stays in their initial willingness (selling or buying) as shown in Fig. 15a • At a temperature between T c1 and T c2 , the position of each group oscillates as shown in Figs. 15b and 15c .
The lower T , the larger the period of oscillation (see Ref. 11 )
• At T near T c2 , the two groups oscillate at the market opening but tend to the market clearance as seen in Fig.  15d .
We show in Fig. 16 the variation of the price corresponding to the temperatures of Figs. 15c and 15d . The price at the market clearance has been arbitrarily fixed to 3. The price oscillates for the market temperature between T c1 and T c2 . For T > T c2 12.10, the price decays to the market clearing price.
Before closing this section we discuss on the effect of a. As seen in Eqs. (12)-(13), a is in competition with the j and k terms. For a given set of (j 1 , j 2 , k 12 , k 21 ), the value of a determines the qualitative dynamics of the system. We have seen an example for a = 5 shown above. We have calculated for other values of a. The results show that larger a will enlarge the temperature region of oscillation behavior, and below a value depending on (j 1 , j 2 , k 12 , k 21 ), the oscillation disappears.
To conclude this section on the MFT, we emphasize that the model used here is a simplest model aiming at showing the non trivial price oscillation in a region of market temperature. Such a regular oscillation stems certainly from the simplified model. We believe however that such a price oscillation bears an important feature of the market reality.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have studied the variation of the price of a good. This price is determined by the behavior of sellers and buyers. An agent decides to buy or to sell according to a probability which takes into account the influence of his neighbors, the price level, the economic ambiance and a specific measure in favor of buying or selling applied during a lapse of time.
We used a spin possessing several internal states representing from selling desire to buying desire. The influence of neighbors is expressed by the majority imitation. The price is defined as proportional to the difference between seller and buyer numbers which is a function of time. The economic ambiance is expressed by a parameter T which plays the role of the temperature in physics. The higher T the more agitation. The specific measure H to boost or to lower the price is applied during a lapse of time by the government or an organism.
Monte Carlo simulations have been performed on a population of agents with the above-mentioned parameters. The results are interesting, showing in particular strong fluctuations of the price in the critical region of T , and a critical value of H above which the boosting effect lasts long time after the removal of the measure. These results may be useful for the government and/or economic organisms to choose the right moment to intervene to modify the market tendency. The second party of the paper deals with the price variation using the mean-field theory. Unlike the Monte Carlo model, we suppose here that the sellers and buyers belong to two distinct communities. Interesting results on the price oscillation are found when we break the symmetry of the inter-group interactions, namely J 1 = J 2 and K 12 = K 21 .
